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Quantitative Data From Rating
Scales: An Epistemological and
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London School of Economics and Political Science, London, United Kingdom
Rating scales are popular methods for generating quantitative data directly by
persons rather than automated technologies. But scholars increasingly challenge their
foundations. This article contributes epistemological and methodological analyses
of the processes involved in person-generated quantification. They are crucial for
measurement because data analyses can reveal information about study phenomena
only if relevant properties were encoded systematically in the data. The Transdisciplinary
Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) is
applied to explore psychological and social-science concepts of measurement and
quantification, including representational measurement theory, psychometric theories
and their precursors in psychophysics. These are compared to theories from metrology
specifying object-dependence of measurement processes and subject-independence
of outcomes as key criteria, which allow tracing data to the instances measured and
the ways they were quantified. Separate histories notwithstanding, the article’s basic
premise is that general principles of scientific measurement and quantification should
apply to all sciences. It elaborates principles by which these metrological criteria can be
implemented also in psychology and social sciences, while considering their research
objects’ peculiarities. Application of these principles is illustrated by quantifications
of individual-specific behaviors (‘personality’). The demands rating methods impose
on data-generating persons are deconstructed and compared with the demands
involved in other quantitative methods (e.g., ethological observations). These analyses
highlight problematic requirements for raters. Rating methods sufficiently specify neither
the empirical study phenomena nor the symbolic systems used as data nor rules
of assignment between them. Instead, pronounced individual differences in raters’
interpretation and use of items and scales indicate considerable subjectivity in data
generation. Together with recoding scale categories into numbers, this introduces a
twofold break in the traceability of rating data, compromising interpretability of findings.
These insights question common reliability and validity concepts for ratings and provide
novel explanations for replicability problems. Specifically, rating methods standardize
only data formats but not the actual data generation. Measurement requires data
generation processes to be adapted to the study phenomena’s properties and the
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measurement-executing persons’ abilities and interpretations, rather than to numerical
outcome formats facilitating statistical analyses. Researchers must finally investigate
how people actually generate ratings to specify the representational systems underlying
rating data.
Keywords: qualitative-quantitative integration, observational methods, assessment methods, transdisciplinary
approach, quantitative methods in the social sciences, measurement, quantification, data
INTRODUCTION
Quantifications are central to many fields of research and applied
settings because numerical data allow to analyze information
using the power of mathematics (Chalmers, 2013; Porter, 1995;
Trierweiler and Stricker, 1998). In psychology and social sciences
(e.g., education, sociology, political science), quantitative data
are often generated with rating methods in which persons
indicate their judgments of predefined statements on multi-stage
scales (e.g., standardized assessments, surveys or questionnaires).
Rating scales are also used in many applied sectors (e.g.,
government, business, management, industry, public media) to
help answer key questions, make decisions and develop strategies,
such as for national policies, health programs, personnel selection
and marketing (Menon and Yorkston, 2000; Abran et al., 2012;
Hammersley, 2013). Accurate quantifications are thus critically
important.
Increasing Criticism of Rating Scales
The strong reliance on rating methods is, however, increasingly
criticized (Baumeister et al., 2007; Fahrenberg et al., 2007;
Grzyb, 2016; Dolin´ski, 2018). Scholars from various disciplines
scrutinize their underlying epistemologies and measurement
theories (Wagoner and Valsiner, 2005; Trendler, 2009; Vautier
et al., 2012; Hammersley, 2013; Bringmann and Eronen, 2015;
Buntins et al., 2016; Tafreshi et al., 2016; Bruschi, 2017; Humphry,
2017; Valsiner, 2017; Guyon et al., 2018). These developments
are still largely unnoticed by mainstream psychologists who
currently focus on the replication crisis, which they aim
to solve by scrutinizing the epistemological foundations of
significance testing, confidence interval estimations and Bayesian
approaches (Nosek et al., 2015; Open Science Collaboration,
2015; Wagenmakers et al., 2016; Zwaan et al., 2017)—thus, by
improving issues of data analysis.
But processes of data generation are largely understudied.
Discussions are limited to debates about so-called ‘qualitative’
versus ‘quantitative’ methods, a common polarization suggesting
some methods could be quantitative but not qualitative, and
vice versa. Previous debates revolve around irreconcilable
differences in underlying epistemologies (e.g., constructivist
versus naïve-realist). To balance their respective advantages
and disadvantages, both methods are combined in mixed-
method designs (Creswell, 2003). But the methodological
foundations of the operational procedures by which ‘quantitative’
and ‘qualitative’ data are generated are hardly discussed.
Specifically, so-called ‘quantitative’ data are commonly generated
by lay people who may be largely unaware of the positivist
epistemology underlying the scales they are ticking. But even
if they knew, what would this tell them about how to
generate data? Likewise, laypeople are commonly unfamiliar
with measurement theories. So how can they, by intuitively
judging and ticking scales, produce data that meet the axioms of
quantity and measurement? What considerations and decisions
must raters actually make to justify interpretation of rating
outcomes as ‘quantitative’ data? And in what ways do scientists’
axioms and theories of measurement inform raters’ decisions?
Current debates are surprisingly silent about these fundamental
issues.
Problematic findings with rating scales increasingly emerge.
On widely used Big Five personality scales, differences between
student and general public samples varied substantially and
randomly across 59 countries, showing that, contrary to common
assumptions, student findings cannot be generalized (Hanel and
Vione, 2016). The empirical interrelations among ratings items
used to assess the same personality factor (e.g., ‘outgoing’ and
‘not reserved’ for Extraversion) varied unsystematically across
25 countries, averaging around zero (Ludeke and Larsen, 2017).
These findings seriously question what information these ratings
actually capture.
For wide applications, rating scales are worded in everyday
language, thus capitalizing on raters’ and scientists’ everyday
knowledge. But everyday knowledge is often incoherent,
contradictive and context-dependent (Laucken, 1974;
Hammersley, 2013). What specific knowledge do raters actually
apply? Could it be that ‘outgoing’ has not the same meaning for
students and the general public and not the same for people from
different countries? How do raters choose the scale categories to
indicate their judgements? What does “agree” actually mean to
different people and in what ways is this related to their intuitive
judgements and scientists’ axioms of quantity? Rating data have
been used intensely for almost a century now (Thurstone, 1928;
Likert, 1932); but still little is known about the processes by
which raters actually generate these data.
Aims of This Article
This article contributes to current debates an enquiry of the
epistemological and methodological foundations of rating
scales, which psychologists and social scientists widely use to
generate quantitative data directly by persons rather than using
technologies (see concepts of ‘persons as data generation systems’,
‘human-based measurement’, ‘measurement with persons1’,
1The distinction between ‘data generated with persons’ versus ‘data generated on
persons’ (frequently made in metrology) is irrelevant for the present analyses that
focus on the processes by which persons generate data, no matter whether these
data are about persons, non-human animals or objects.
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‘humans as measurement instrument’; Berglund, 2012; Pendrill,
2014). The focus is on intuitive judgements on multi-stage
rating scales (e.g., Likert-style), not considering comparative
judgment methods (Thurstone, 1927) or questionnaires
involving right and wrong answers (e.g., intelligence tests). The
article explores processes of data generation—before any methods
of data analysis can be applied. These processes are crucial
for measurement and quantification because data can reveal
information about study phenomena only if relevant properties
have been encoded systematically in the data. No method of
analysis, however, sophisticated, can substitute these essential
steps.
A transdisciplinary perspective is adopted to elaborate
epistemological, metatheoretical and methodological
foundations of theories and methods of data generation,
measurement and quantification from psychology and social
sciences but also from biology, physics and especially metrology,
the science of measurement (BIPM, 2006). Metrology was key
to the successes of the physical sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry,
astronomy) but did not form the basis for measurement
theories in psychology and social sciences (Michell, 1999; Mari,
2013). This notwithstanding, the article’s basic premise is that
general principles of scientific measurement and quantification
should apply to all sciences (see also McGrane, 2015; Mari
et al., 2017). This is no utopic ideal. It is a necessity arising
from the complexity of today’s real-world problems that
require application of inter-, multi- and transdisciplinary
approaches. Big Data gain momentum. But statistical results
can be interpreted with regard to real-world phenomena only
if the data fulfill elementary criteria of measurement and
quantification that can be understood and used in the same way
across sciences—without ignoring peculiarities of their objects of
research.
Psychologists and social scientists encounter particular
challenges because their study phenomena are intangible,
highly adaptive and complex, and less rigorously rule-bound
than those explored in other fields (but see Hossenfelder,
2018). Therefore, measurement technologies from physical
sciences and engineering cannot be applied. Moreover, as all
persons are individuals and members of social communities,
scientists exploring these phenomena cannot be independent
of their objects of research. This entails particular risks of
(unintentionally) introducing all kinds of ego-centric and ethno-
centric biases (Uher et al., 2013b; Uher, 2015c).
To elaborate principles by which basic criteria of measurement
and quantification can be met in all sciences while considering
fundamental differences in their objects of research, this
article applies the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science
Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm; Uher,
2015a,b,c,d,e, 2016a,b, 2018b,c). It is well suited for this
purpose because it provides unitary frameworks in which
concepts from psychology, life sciences, social sciences,
physical sciences and metrology that are relevant for research
on individuals have been systematically integrated. It also
puts into focus the individuals who are doing research and
generating data, thus opening up a meta-perspective on research
processes.
First, these frameworks and relevant concepts are briefly
introduced and used to explore epistemological foundations
of measurement and quantification considering concepts from
psychology, social sciences and metrology. Then, principles
by which metrological criteria can also be met in person-
generated quantifications are outlined, highlighting challenges
and limitations. Application of these principles is illustrated by
the example of investigations of individual-specific behaviors
(‘personality’). The demands that rating methods impose on
data-generating persons are systematically deconstructed and
compared with the demands involved in other quantitative
methods (e.g., ethological observations). Closing, the article
highlights problematic assumptions underlying rating methods
as well as implications for their utility to improve replicability and
transparency in psychology and social sciences.
TRANSDISCIPLINARY
PHILOSOPHY-OF-SCIENCE PARADIGM
FOR RESEARCH ON INDIVIDUALS
(TPS-PARADIGM)
The TPS-Paradigm comprises a system of interrelated
philosophical, metatheoretical and methodological frameworks
(paradigm) in which concepts, approaches and methods from
various disciplines (transdisciplinary) for exploring phenomena
in or in relation to individuals were systematically integrated,
further developed and complemented by novel ones. Its purpose
is to make explicit the presuppositions, metatheories and
methodologies underlying scientific systems (philosophy-of-
science) to help researchers critically reflect on; discuss and
refine their theories, models and practices; and derive ideas for
novel developments (for a schematic overview, see Figure 1; for
introductions Uher, 2015a,c, 2018c; for more information and
empirical applications2).
Philosophical Framework
The philosophical framework specifies presuppositions made
about individuals’ nature and properties and the fundamental
notions by which knowledge about them can be gained. Three
presuppositions are important.
Complexity Theories
Complexity theories, developed amongst others in philosophy
(Hartmann, 1964), thermodynamics (Prigogine and Stengers,
1984), physics of life (Capra, 1997), theoretical biology (von
Bertalanffy, 1937), medicine (Rothschuh, 1963), and psychology
(Wundt, 1863; Koffka, 1935; Vygotsky and Luria, 1994) allow to
conceive individuals as living organisms organized at different
levels forming nested systems, from molecules and cells over
individuals up to societies. At each level, they function as
integrated wholes in which dynamic non-linear processes occur
from which new properties emerge not completely predictable
from their constituents (principle of emergence). These new
properties can feed back to the constituents from which they
2researchonindividuals.org
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FIGURE 1 | TPS-Paradigm: schematic overview. Its interrelated frameworks and key topics, the disciplines involved and previous applications in empirical studies.
emerge, causing complex patterns of upward and downward
causation. With increasing levels of organization, ever more
complex systems and phenomena emerge that are less rule-
bound, highly adaptive and historically unique (Morin, 2008).
This applies especially to psychological and social-science objects
of research.
Complementarity
This concept highlights that particular objects of research
can be exhaustively understood only by describing two
mutually exclusive properties that are irreducible and maximally
incompatible with one another, thus requiring different frames
of reference, truth criteria and investigative methods, and that
may therefore be regarded as complementary to one another
(Fahrenberg, 1979, 2013; Hoche, 2008; Walach, 2013). This
concept was applied to the wave-particle dilemma in research
on the nature of light (Heisenberg, 1927; Bohr, 1937) and
to the body-mind problem (Brody and Oppenheim, 1969;
Fahrenberg, 1979, 2013; Walach and Römer, 2011). In this
problem, called psyche-physicality problem in the TPS-Paradigm
given its particular terminology (see below; Uher, 2015c),
complementarity takes a metaphysically neutral stance without
making assumptions of either ontological dualism or monism
while emphasizing the necessity for methodical dualism to
account for observations of two categorically different realities
that require different frames of reference, approaches and
methods (Walach, 2013). In the TPS-Paradigm, complementarity
is also applied to resolve the nomothetic-idiographic controversy
in ‘personality’ research (Uher, 2015d).
Human-Made Science
The third presupposition concerns explicit recognition that
all science is created by humans, hence on the basis of
humans’ perceptual (Wundt, 1907) and conceptual abilities
(interpretations; Peirce, 1958, CP 2.308). This does not imply
ideas of radical constructivism (von Glasersfeld, 1991), positing
that concepts had no representational connection with a reality
existing outside of individuals’ minds and that knowledge could
be developed without reference to an ontological reality in
which humans have evolved over millions of years (Uher,
2015a). But it also clearly rejects naïve realist assumptions that
individuals’ senses could enable direct and objective perceptions
of the external reality ‘as it really is’. Instead, it highlights
that we can gain access to this reality only through our
human perceptual and cognitive abilities, which inevitably
limits our possibilities to explore and understand this reality.
This epistemological position comes close to those of critical
realism (Bhaskar and Danermark, 2006) and pragmatism-
realism (Guyon et al., 2018). They emphasize the reality of
the objects of research and their knowability but also that our
knowledge about this reality is created on the basis of our
practical engagement with and collective appraisal of that reality.
Knowledge is therefore theory-laden, socially embedded and
historically contingent.
As science inherently involves an anthropocentric perspective,
a phenomenon is defined in the TPS-Paradigm as anything that
humans can perceive or (technically) make perceivable and/or
that humans can conceive (Uher, 2015c). This notion differs from
various philosophical definitions (e.g., Kant’s, 1781/1998).
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Metatheoretical Framework
Three Metatheoretical Properties Determining
Perceptibility by Humans
The TPS-Paradigm’s metatheoretical framework builds on
three metatheoretical properties conceivable in different
forms for phenomena studied in research on individuals.
These particular properties are considered because they
determine a phenomenon’s perceptibility, which has important
methodological implications (see below). Given the focus on
research on individuals, these properties are conceived in
dimensions of everyday experiences (e.g., scaled to human
bodies, international time standards), ignoring micro- or macro-
dimensions explored in some fields (e.g., atomic and outer-space
dimensions).
These properties are (1) a phenomenon’s location in relation
to the studied individual’s body (e.g., internal, external), (2)
its temporal extension (e.g., transient, temporally extended)—
both dimensional properties—and (3) its spatial extension
conceived as physical versus “non-physical”. Physicality here
refers to concepts of classical physics, because they match
everyday experiences, unlike quantum physical ones. Physical
denotes corporeal/bodily/material phenomena (matter) as well as
immaterial physical phenomena (e.g., heat, movements), which
are not corporeal in themselves but become manifest in material
phenomena with which they are systematically connected. All
physical phenomena are spatially extended. But spatial properties
cannot be conceived for “non-physical” phenomena, which are
not simply contrasted against the physical (as indicated by the
quotation marks) and therefore conceived as complementary.
This distinction resembles Descartes’ res extensa and res cogitans
(Hirschberger, 1980) but implies only a methodical rather than
an ontological dualism (Uher, 2015c, 2016a). These properties are
labeled metatheoretical because they reflect a level of abstraction
not commonly considered, and only time and space constitute
ontological categories.
Different Kinds of Phenomena Studied in Research
on Individuals
The three properties are used to metatheoretically differentiate
various kinds of phenomena, which differ in their particular
constellations in these properties’ forms. For example,
morphological phenomena (living organism’s structures
and their constituting parts) are internal/external, temporally
extended and material physical. Physiological phenomena
(morphology’s chemical and physical functioning) are primarily
internal, mostly transient and immaterial physical (Figure 2A).
These conceptual differentiations, as they are accessibility-based,
have important methodical implications for data generation
shown below.
Basic kinds of phenomena: inseparable from the individual’s
bodily entity
Four kinds of phenomena are conceived as basic because they
are inseparable from the intact individual’s body: morphology,
physiology, behavior and psyche (see Figure 2A; for details,
Uher, 2015a). For the present analyses, the conceptual distinction
between psyche and behavior is important.
Behaviors are defined as the “external changes or activities of
living organisms that are functionally mediated by other external
phenomena in the present moment” (Uher, 2016b, p. 490).
Thus, behaviors are external, transient and (mostly immaterial)
physical phenomena (e.g., movements, vocalizations). The
psyche is defined as “the entirety of the phenomena of
the immediate experiential reality both conscious and non-
conscious of living organisms” (Uher, 2016a, p. 303; with
immediacy indicating absence of phenomena mediating their
perception; see Wundt, 1894). The psyche’s phenomena are
essential for all sciences because they are the means by which
any science is made. A science exploring the psyche must
therefore distinguish between its objects of research and its tools
for investigating them. Therefore, the psyche’s phenomena in
themselves are termed psychical, whereas psychological denotes
the body of knowledge (Greek -λoγßα, -logia) about psychical
phenomena3.
Psychical phenomena (e.g., cognitions, emotions, and
motivations) are conceived as located entirely internal and
perceivable only by each individual itself and nobody else4
(Locke, 1999). Differences in temporal extension distinguish
experiencings (Erleben), which are transient and bound to the
here-and-now (e.g., thoughts, emotions), from memorized
psychical resultants or commonly experiences (Erfahrung), which
are, although accessible only through experiencings, temporally
more extended in themselves (e.g., sensory and psychical
representations, knowledge, abilities; with memorisation here
broadly referring to any retention process). Unlike immaterial
physical phenomena (e.g., heat, x-radiation), the psyche’s
immaterial properties show neither spatial properties in
themselves nor systematic relations to the spatial properties of
physical phenomena to which they are bound (e.g., brain matter
and physiology) and are therefore conceived as “non-physical”,
reflecting complementary psyche-physicality relations (see
Fahrenberg, 2013).
Internality, imperceptibility by others and lack of spatial
properties differentiate psyche from possible externalizations in
behaviors and language from which psychical phenomena can
only be inferred indirectly. This has important implications for
language-based methods like ratings as shown below.
Composite kinds of phenomena comprising both phenomena
inseparable from the individual’s body and phenomena
independent of it
In the TPS-Paradigm, three further kinds of phenomena
are conceptually distinguished: semiotic representations (e.g.,
written and spoken language)—phenomena essential for rating
methods—as well as artificial outer-appearance modifications
(e.g., clothes) and contexts (e.g., situations) not considered here
(see Uher, 2015a,c). They are conceived as composites because
they comprise phenomena of different kind (as distinguished by
3This distinction is made in many languages (e.g., Dutch, French, German, Italian,
and Russian) but not commonly in the English.
4In the TPS-Paradigm, assumptions of extended mind are rejected because
psychical phenomena in themselves are differentiated from their possible
expression in behaviors and language, which form inherent parts of extended mind
concepts (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Logan, 2007).
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FIGURE 2 | Kinds of phenomena. In the TPS-Paradigm, various kinds of phenomena are conceptually differentiated by the particular constellation of forms regarding
the three metatheoretical properties determinating their perceptibility. Two types are distinguished: (A) basic kinds of phenomena are characterized by their
inseparability from individuals’ bodies, and (B) composite kinds of phenomena by their complexity and heterogeneity of the phenomena involved, some of which are
independent of individuals’ bodies.
the three metatheoretical properties) that are tightly interrelated
with one another, forming a functional whole from which new
properties emerge (Figure 2B). These new properties can be
explored only by studying the composite’s constituents in their
functional interdependence. Importantly, these composites
are conceptual and not demarcated by physical boundaries
(unlike, e.g., biological cells). Instead, their constituents
are located apart from one another, which considerably
complicates their exploration as semiotic representations
illustrate.
Semiotic representations (e.g., written language) are
composites in which (a) particular psychical constituents
(the signified; e.g., meanings, mental representations) are
tightly interrelated with (b) particular physical constituents
external to individuals’ bodies (the signifier; e.g., ink on paper,
vocalizations) and (c) particular referents to which both refer
and which may be located external or internal to individuals’
bodies. These three constituents form a functional composite
from which new properties emerge—those of signs (sign
includes the notion of symbol in the TPS-Paradigm). For
example, a semiotic representation may comprise (a) ideas
and meanings of bottles, (b) visual (graphic) patterns shaped
like “BOTTLE” or “Flasche” (German for bottle), or acoustic
(phonetic) patterns like [’b6t.@l] or [‘flaS@] and (c) some bottles
to which both refer (Figure 3). Visual and acoustic patterns
are external physical and can thus be perceived by others
and used to decode the meanings and referents someone
may have encoded in them. Importantly, meanings are not
inherent to the physical signifiers in themselves but only
assigned to them. Meaning construction occurs in people’s
minds; it is internal and psychical (“non-physical”). The term
semiotic representation highlights that individuals’ psychical
representations are the essential component that interconnects
a sign’s signifier with its referent. These three constituents are
all located apart and not demarcated as an entity and therefore
cannot be straightforwardly recognized as a composite. Socially
shared assignments turn such composites into signs—but only
for persons making such attributions (the signs’ psychical
constituent). Such assignments are arbitrary and therefore vary
(e.g., different alphabets; Vygotsky, 1962; Westen, 1996; Uher,
2015a). For these reasons, semiotic representations are complex
and metatheoretically heterogeneous, involving external and
internal, physical and “non-physical”, temporally extended
and transient phenomena. This considerably complicates
explorations, such as their function as data.
Excurse: data – semiotic representations used to encode
information about the study phenomena
Data are signs (symbols) that scientists use to represent
information about the study phenomena in physically
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FIGURE 3 | Semiotic representations: data. Semiotic representations are composites comprising both phenomena internal and phenomena external to individuals.
Their intangible composite connections are established through the psychical constituent (a), which enables a sign’s external physical constituent (b) to denote its
referent (c) also in absence of the latter.
persistent and easily perceivable ways. Thus, data are semiotic
representations—composites comprising particular physical
constituents (e.g., visible patterns like “two” or “2”) to which
particular persons (e.g., scientists, observers) assign particular
meanings (e.g., mathematical properties) and refer both to
particular referents—the properties and phenomena under study
(e.g., numbers of bottles; Figure 3).
Important types of data are numerals (apart from textual
data). Numerals comprise physical constituents (e.g., visible
patterns shaped like 1, 5, 10, and 50) to which individuals
often—but not always—attribute the meaning of numbers. As
such attributions are arbitrary, the meaning of numbers can
also be attributed to other physical constituents (e.g., visible
patterns shaped like I, V, X, L). Vice versa, different meanings
can be assigned to the same signifiers that then constitute
different signs (e.g., Roman numerals also represent alphabet
characters). Consequently, not all numerals represent numbers.
Whether or not numerals represent numbers depends on the
meanings attributed by their creators—an important point for
data generation.
Data, as they are signs (symbols), can be stored, manipulated,
decomposed and recomposed, that is, analyzed in lieu of the
actual phenomena under study (the referents) and in ways
not applicable to these latter. But inferences about the study
phenomena can be made only if the data represent relevant
properties of these phenomena in appropriate ways. This is
a further important point for data generation taken up again
below.
Methodological Framework
Data Generation Methods Are Determined by the
Study Phenomena’s Modes of Perceptibility: Basic
Principles and Method Classes
The three properties, because they describe modes of
perceptibility under everyday conditions, also specify the
ways to make phenomena accessible under research conditions.
Therefore, these metatheoretical properties are used in the
TPS-Paradigm to derive methodological principles and define
basic method classes that cut across common classifications,
which specify properties of data once these are generated (e.g.,
‘qualitative’, ‘quantitative’; Uher, 2018a).
External phenomena (e.g., behaviors) are publicly accessible
and can be studied without any mechanism standing between
observer and observed using observational methods. Internal
physical phenomena (e.g., brain), by contrast, are imperceptible
under everyday conditions but can be made perceptible under
research conditions using invasive or technical methods (e.g.,
surgery, X-ray).
Temporally extended phenomena (e.g., body morphology) do
not change quickly, which facilitates perception and enables
repeated perception of the same entity. Transient phenomena
(e.g., behaviors, nerve potentials), by contrast, can be perceived
and recorded only in the brief moments when they occur,
thus real-time using so-called nunc-ipsum5 methods (e.g.,
observations, EEG).
5Derived from the Latin nunc ipsum for at this very instant.
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Physical phenomena, both material and immaterial (e.g.,
morphology, heat), are spatially extended. Therefore, they can
be captured with physical methods, which rely on the spatial
extensions of materials that are systematically related to and
more easily perceivable than the study phenomena (Uher, 2018a),
such as mercury in glass tubes for measuring temperature (see
Chang, 2004). Psychical phenomena, given their non-spatial
(“non-physical”) properties, are inaccessible by any physical
method and cannot be made perceivable by others. This
unique property is used in the TPS-Paradigm to distinguish
methods enabling access to psychical phenomena from those that
cannot.
Introquestive6 methods are all procedures for studying
phenomena that can be perceived only from within the
individual itself and by nobody else in principle under all
possible conditions. This applies to psychical phenomena, which
can be explored by others only indirectly through individuals’
externalizations (e.g., behaviors, language). Accordingly,
all methods of self-report and inner self-observation are
introquestive. Extroquestive7 methods, by contrast, are all
procedures for studying phenomena that are or can (technically)
be made perceptible by multiple individuals (Figure 4). This
applies to all physical phenomena (including internal and
immaterial ones, e.g., inner organs, heat) because they can be
made perceptible using invasive or technical methods (e.g.,
surgery, EEG). Joint perception of the same entity by multiple
individuals (e.g., observers) is essential for data quality assurance
(e.g., establishing intersubjectivity; see below; Uher, 2016a,
2018a).
Previous concepts of introspection versus extrospection are
distinguished from one another with regard to the studied
individual by denoting its “inward perspective” versus
“outward perspective”, respectively (Schwitzgebel, 2016).
6Derived from the Latin intro for in, within; and quaerere for to seek, enquire.
7Derived from the Latin extro for beyond, outside.
FIGURE 4 | Introquestion versus extroquestion. Basic classes of methods for
investigating psychical versus physical phenomena.
These two perspectives are, however, not perceived as separate
channels of information. Instead, they are always merged
in the multifaceted unity emerging from the composite of
all perceptions available at any moment (Wundt, 1894).
Therefore, introspection and extrospection cannot be
differentiated as methods. By contrast, extroquestion and
introquestion are defined and differentiated on the basis of
(a) the particular study phenomena (e.g., sounds, thoughts),
considering that other internal and external phenomena
can be simultaneously perceived, and of (b) the particular
persons who perceive the study phenomena and generate
from their perceptions data about these phenomena (Uher,
2016a).
These concepts highlight that psychophysical investigations
of relations between sensory perceptions and physical stimuli
(Fechner, 1860; Titchener, 1905)—commonly interpreted
as introspective—are actually extroquestive methods. The
physical stimuli (e.g., lights, sounds) are external to participants’
bodies and therefore perceivable also by the experimenters. Only
because physical stimuli are extroquestively accessible can they be
experimentally varied and compared with individuals’ subjective
judgements. Thus, contrary to widespread assumptions,
psychophysical findings about sensory perceptions cannot be
generalized to perceptions of phenomena that are accessible only
introquestively. Involvement of perceptions does not qualify
investigations as introquestive because perceptions are always
involved in any investigation (e.g., natural-science observation;
Uher, 2016a, 2018a).
This perceptibility-based classification of data generation
methods highlights that a phenomenon’s modes of accessibility
determine unequivocally the class of methods required
for its investigation. Each kind of phenomenon can be
captured only with particular method classes and no
method class allows for exploring all kinds of phenomena
(see complementarity; Uher, 2018a). These are further
important points for data generation taken up again
below.
MEASUREMENT AND QUANTIFICATION
ACROSS THE SCIENCES
The TPS-Paradigm’s frameworks and the concepts outlined
above are now applied to explore concepts of measurement
and quantification, highlighting commonalities and differences
among sciences.
Measurement Versus Quantification
In psychology, quantification and measurement are often
considered synonyms; but they are not the same. Quantification
generally denotes the assignment of numbers, whereas
measurement denotes a purposeful multi-step process,
comprising operative structures for making such assignments in
reliable and valid ways together with explanations of how this is
achieved (Maul et al., 2018). Hence, not every quantification is
an outcome of measurement (Abran et al., 2012).
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Concepts of Quantity and Early
Measurement Theories
What Is a Quantity?
A quantity is a divisible property of entities of the same kind—
thus, of the same quality. Two types are distinguished, multitudes
and magnitudes (Hartmann, 1964).
Multitudes are discontinuous and discrete quantities that are
divisible into indivisibles and discontinuous parts, which are
countable—numerable—and therefore expressible as a number
(e.g., persons, eyeblinks). Thus, multitudes are quantities by their
ontological nature (Hartmann, 1964). Magnitudes, by contrast,
are continuous and unified quantities that are divisible into
divisibles and continuous parts. Magnitudes can be directly
compared and rank-ordered in terms of ‘more’, ‘less’, or ‘equal’
(e.g., body length). By comparing a target property’s magnitude
with the magnitudes of designated references of the same kind
of property (e.g., length of units on rulers), which constitute
multitudes and are thus countable, their ratios can be expressed as
a measurement unit (e.g., meter) and a number (JCGM200:2012,
2012).
Early Measurement Theories and the Fundamental
Problem of Psychological and Social-Science
Measurement
From an epistemological analysis of counting and measuring
(von Helmholtz, 1887), Hölder (1901) axiomatized
equality/inequality, ordering and additivity relations among
physical magnitudes, thereby laying the foundations for their
measurement (Michell, 1997; Finkelstein, 2003). Quantities
for which additive operations can be empirically constructed
and quantities that can be derived from them led to further
measurement concepts. In fundamental (direct) measurement,
quantities are obtained directly (e.g., length). In derived
measurement, the target quantity is obtained indirectly
from relations between other directly measurable quantities
(e.g., volume from length; Campbell, 1920). In associative
measurement, the target quantity is obtained indirectly through
measurement of another quantity with which it is systematically
connected (e.g., temperature through length of mercury in glass
tubes; Ellis, 1966; Chang, 2004).
Psychophysicists, pioneers of early psychology, studied
equality and ordering relationships of sensory perceptions
of physical stimuli (e.g., just-noticeable-differences and
comparative judgements of light stimuli; Titchener, 1905),
which is possible only because they constitute extroquestive
explorations. But the properties of psychical phenomena
in themselves, especially non-sensory ones (e.g., thoughts,
emotions, and motivations), cannot be empirically added
(concatenated) or derived from additive quantities. The
possibility of their measurement was therefore rejected by
the British Association’s for the Advancement of Science
committee for quantitative methods (Ferguson et al., 1940; see
also Kant, 1786/2016; Trendler, 2018). This led psychologists
and social scientists to focus on relational models, operational
theories and utility concepts (Michell, 1999; Finkelstein,
2003).
Representational Theory of
Measurement
Representational theory of measurement, developed in the social
sciences, formalizes (non-contradictory) axiomatic conditions
by which empirical relational structures can be mapped onto
symbolic relational structures, especially numerical ones (Krantz
et al., 1971; Suppes, 2002). For measurement, these many-to-one
mappings (homo- or isomorphisms) must be performed such
that the study phenomena’s properties and their interrelations
are appropriately represented by the properties and interrelations
of the signs used as data (representation theorem). Permissible
transformations specify how the numerical representations can
be further transformed without breaking the mapping between
the empirical relations under study and the numerical ones
generated (uniqueness theorem; Figure 5; Vessonen, 2017).
In physical sciences and engineering, representational theory
plays no role, however, despite its applicability (Finkelstein,
2003). This may be because it formalizes initial stages of
measurement and important conditions of measurability but
does not stipulate any particular measurement procedures
(Mari et al., 2017). Another problem concerns establishing
measurability (i.e., evidence of ordered additive structures of
the same quality) because not just any mapping of numbers
onto empirical relational structures constitutes measurement.
But the appropriateness of particular numerical representations
FIGURE 5 | Representational theory of measurement. Key elements of
representational systems frequently used in psychological and social-science
concepts of measurement.
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is often only assumed rather than established, thereby reducing
the interpretability of the generated symbolic representation
regarding the empirical phenomena under study (Blanton and
Jaccard, 2006; Vessonen, 2017).
Psychometric Theories of Measurement
Psychometric theories are concerned with statistical modeling
approaches, building on various positivist epistemologies
that focus on empirical evidence and predictive ability
(instrumentalist focus) rather than on finding true explanations
of reality. Therefore, some psychometricians apply operationalist
epistemologies and determine study phenomena by the methods
used for their exploration (Bridgman, 1927), such as by defining
intelligence as “what an IQ-test measures” (Boring, 1923; van
der Maas et al., 2014). This, however, reduces measurement to
any number-yielding operation (Dingle, 1950). It also ignores
that measurement results constitute information that can be
understood also outside the specific context in which they were
generated (Mari et al., 2017). The ability to represent information
also in absence of their referents is a key feature of semiotic
representations like data (Uher, 2015a, 2016b).
Psychometricians applying classical test theory or probabilistic
latent trait theory (e.g., item response theory, Rasch modeling)
sometimes build on naïve realist epistemologies by assuming
ratios of invariant quantities exist in the world and independently
of the methods used (Mari et al., 2017). Hence, they assume
that ideal methods (e.g., purposefully designed rating scales)
allow to empirically implement an identity function, turning
pre-existing ‘real’ scores into estimated (manifest) scores—
although with errors or only certain probabilities, which,
however, can be defined with reference to the assumed ‘true’
scores or ‘latent trait’ scores, respectively. But this ignores
that interactions between study properties and methods always
influence the results obtained (Heisenberg, 1927; Bohr, 1937;
Mari et al., 2017). In human-generated measurement, these
interactions are intricate because they are mediated by the data-
generating persons who perceive and interpret—thus interact
with—both the study properties (whether located internally or
externally) and the methods used (e.g., rating scales, observation
schemes). Metrologists’ concepts of ‘humans as measuring
instruments’ (Pendrill, 2014) and psychometrician’s concepts of
rating scales as ‘measuring instruments’ do not reflect these
triadic relationships.
Metrological Concepts of Measurement
and Scientific Quantification
To justify that quantifications can be attributed to the
objects of research, metrologists define measurement as a
purposive process comprising operative structures that establish
evidence for its object-dependence (“objectivity”) and the
subject-independence of its results (“intersubjectivity”; Figure 6
Frigerio et al., 2010; Mari et al., 2012, 2017). Importantly, in
metrology, “objectivity” refers to the object of research and
denotes that measurement processes depend on the objects and
properties under study (therefore object-dependence)—compliant
with complementarity. Results are “intersubjective” if they are
“invariant with respect to the substitution of the involved
subjects” (Mari et al., 2017)—thus, the persons generating and
using them (therefore subject-independence). In psychology, by
contrast, “objectivity” commonly denotes intersubjectivity in
terms of independence from the investigator. It refers to the
results not the process, thus confounding two metrological
criteria of measurement.
An important way of establishing object-dependence and
subject-independence is to implement traceability. Traceability
requires measurement results to be systematically connected
FIGURE 6 | Traceability. Metrological concepts stipulate basic and testable elements of measurement procedures linking measurement results (data) with the
phenomena and properties under study through traceable conversions of information. They provide key concepts by which symbolic (e.g., numerical) relational
systems can be mapped onto empirical relational systems, which were left undefined in representational measurement theory.
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through an unbroken and documented chain of comparisons to a
reference (comparator; Figure 6), which can be a measurement
standard or the definition of a measurement unit through
its practical realization (JCGM200:2012, 2012). This allows
measurement results to be traced back to the particular instances
of the properties measured (objects of research) and the particular
comparisons and standards by which quantifications were
obtained (empirical examples below).
These concepts stipulate basic and testable elements of
measurement procedures by which ‘numbers can be mapped
onto empirical relational structures’, thus allowing to establish
evidence of measurability and intersubjectivity of the results
obtained—key elements, left undefined in representational
measurement theory (Figure 6). In the TPS-Paradigm, numerical
data that fulfill these metrological criteria are called scientific
quantifications as opposed to (subjective) quantifications in
which these are not fulfilled.
PERSON-GENERATED MEASUREMENT
AND SCIENTIFIC QUANTIFICATION:
BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR FULFILLING
METROLOGICAL CRITERIA IN
PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
This section elaborates principles by which metrological concepts
of measurement, although developed for physical phenomena,
can also be met in investigations of “non-physical” phenomena,
highlighting challenges and limitations.
Establishing Object-Dependent
Measurement Processes and
Subject-Independent Results:
Some Challenges
To connect objects of research (empirical relational structures)
and measurement results (symbolic relational structures)
through unbroken documented chains of comparisons, suitable
operational processes must be established including explanations
of how unbroken chaining is achieved (for issues of measurement
uncertainty, not discussed here, see Giordani and Mari, 2012,
2014; Mari et al., 2017).
Constructs: Defining Theoretical Ideas
Psychological and social-science objects of research can be
conceived very differently (e.g., behaviors, attitudes). Therefore,
researchers must theoretically define the phenomena and
properties of interest. Theoretical definitions describe the objects
of research—in representative measurement theoretical terms,
the empirical entities under study and their relational structures.
Theoretical concepts are abstract and generalized ideas, which
necessarily differ from their perceivable referents (Daston and
Galison, 2007; Uher, 2015a). Abstract concepts (e.g., ‘personality’,
‘extraversion’, ‘social status’) describe complex constellations of
phenomena that cannot be directly perceived at any moment but
that are only theoretically constructed as entities (therefore called
constructs; Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). Hence, their theoretical
definition is a matter of decision, which can but need not
be intersubjectively agreed (see, e.g., different definitions and
theories of ‘personality’).
Measurement Variables: Encoding Perceivable
Qualities
As abstract ideas, constructs cannot be measured in themselves.
Therefore, constructs are often called ‘latent’ in terms of
‘underlying’ and not directly perceivable, which often misleads
people to reify constructs as real entities internal to individuals
(e.g., ‘traits’ as psychophysical mechanisms; Uher, 2013).
To enable quantification, constructs must be operationally
defined, thus, be related systematically to specific indicators
that are directly measurable and used to quantify a construct
indirectly. Erroneous analogies are sometimes drawn to indirect
physical measurement, where the target quantity is derived
from measurement of other directly measurable quantities (see
above). But indirect measurement builds on natural connections
among different kinds of quantities, which are experimentally
identifiable whereas construct operationalization is a matter
of decision, which may, but need not, be intersubjectively
agreed (see, e.g., the different models and operationalizations of
‘personality’).
The complexity of constructs requires multiple indicators;
but no set of indicators, however, large, can be all-inclusive
(e.g., comprehensively operationalize ‘personality’). Constructs
imply more meaning (surplus meaning) than the indicators
by which they are operationalized. To ensure sufficient
coverage, researchers specify a construct’s meanings in a
theoretical framework of more specific sub-constructs and
establish links to an empirical framework comprising sets
of indicators. For example, popular models of the abstract
construct of ‘personality’ comprise various more specific
constructs (e.g., ‘extraversion’, ‘neuroticism’, ‘agreeableness’,
and ‘conscientiousness’), each of which, in turn, comprises
various sub-constructs (e.g., ‘gregariousness’, ‘assertiveness’)
operationalized with various variables (e.g., rating items).
Psychotechnical engineering, where variables are purposefully
chosen to operationalize theoretically defined constructs
(following representational measurement theory), is aimed
at generating aggregate scores for defined sets of variables
(Cronbach and Meehl, 1955; Messick, 1995; Vautier et al., 2012).
This differs from psychometric engineering, where construct
definitions are derived from empirical interrelations among
variables (following operationist assumptions; Thissen, 2001;
Vautier et al., 2012). The Big Five personality constructs, for
example, were derived from ratings on person-descriptors
taken from the lexicon and are defined by these ratings’
empirical interrelations as studied with factor analysis (therefore,
commonly called ‘personality’ factors; Uher, 2015d).
While these issues are well-known and intensely discussed,
psychometricians hardly ever specify how the data-generating
persons can actually identify the empirical relational system
and execute the assignments to the symbolic relational system.
This likely results from the deficiencies of representational
measurement theory and psychometric theories but also from
the “non-physical” objects of research and language-based data
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generation methods. Specifically, constructs are abstract ideas
that ‘exist’ as entities only in people’s mind and language.
When concepts constituted by words are explored with methods
constituted by words, it is difficult to distinguish the methods
from the measures of the object of research (Lahlou, 1998; Uher,
2015d). Rating scales serve both as descriptors of the empirical
relational system and as elements of the symbolic relational
systems, thus confounding two key elements of representational
measurement theory. Psychometricians provide raters neither
with clear definitions of each relational system nor with
specifications of the assignments to be made between them,
leaving their interpretation and execution to raters’ intuitive
judgments and decisions (Figure 7).
As data generation requires interaction with the objects
of research, persons must be able to directly perceive them.
Consequently, data generation methods must be used that match
the study phenomena’s modes of perceptibility (see above).
Researchers must define the study phenomena in terms of their
perceivable qualitative properties and must specify the variables in
which they are (commonly lexically) encoded (Figure 8).
FIGURE 7 | Rating items confound empirical and relational system. Rating
scales serve both as descriptors of the empirical relational system and as
elements of the symbolic relational system, thus confounding two key
elements of representational measurement theory. Psychometricians provide
neither definitions of each relational system nor specifications for assignments
between them, leaving their interpretation and execution to raters’ intuitive
judgments and decisions.
Measurement Units: Encoding Perceivable Quantities
For each measurement variable, researchers must then define
measurement units. As they belong to the same variable, units
refer to properties conceived as identical or at least sufficiently
similar—thus, of the same quality.
Different types of units are used. Nominal units encode
either more specific qualities or, as binary units, absence versus
presence of the quality of interest, whereas rational, interval and
ordinal units encode divisible properties of the quality studied,
thus quantitative properties. For each unit type, permissible
transformations are specified that maintain the mapping to the
empirical relational system under study (Stevens, 1946). Hence,
the empirical relational system’s properties determine which
unit type can be used. For person-generated quantification,
researchers must define divisible properties of the study
phenomena that are or can be made directly perceivable during
data generation (Figure 8).
Encoding Procedure: Defining Fixed and Unchanging
Assignment Rules
For measurement, the same properties must always be encoded
with the same signs so that the data obtained always represent
the same information and can be understood and used by others
in the same way, thus subject-independently. This presupposes
explicit assignment rules (e.g., many-to-one mappings), variables,
units and values that are fixed and unchanging. Metatheoretically
speaking, the symbolic systems (e.g., observational encoding
scheme) must be intersubjectively understood with regard to the
referents and meanings they are meant to semiotically encode.
Decisions to Be Made by the Person
Generating the Data During
Measurement Execution
To execute a measurement task, persons must have certain
abilities and make various decisions (Figure 9), which form
inherent parts of data generation methods (Uher, 2018a).
Extroquestive accessibility of study phenomena enables multiple
persons to jointly perceive the same entity. This facilitates
establishing intersubjective consensus in making these decisions
(i.e., subject-independence).
Demarcating the Entities of Interest Using
Perceivable Properties
First, in the multitude of a study phenomenon’s perceivable
properties, data-generating persons must be able to demarcate
the entities of interest in reliable and systematic ways. They must
decide which pieces of information should be demarcated in what
ways using perceivable similarities and dissimilarities. Variations
in perceivable properties (e.g., in spatio-temporal extensions in
behaviors) complicate these decisions (e.g., which demarcable
entities are sufficiently similar to count as being of the same kind;
Figure 9).
Categorizing Demarcated Entities Using Theoretical
Considerations
Then, data-generating persons must decide how to categorize
the demarcated entities using perceivable properties but also
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FIGURE 8 | Theoretical definition and empirical operationalization. Process structure for measurement directly by persons in research on individuals.
similarities and differences in their known or assumed functions
and meanings—thus, theoretical and contextual considerations.
For example, the behavioral acts of slapping someone to kill a
mosquito and to bully that individual feature almost identical
perceivable properties but differ in function and meaning;
whereas smiling, talking and shaking hands have similar social
functions but differ in their perceivable spatio-temporal forms
(Figure 9). This shows why data generation is always theory-
laden; as Einstein already said “it is the theory which decides what
can be observed” (Heisenberg, 1989, p. 10). When researchers
provide no system for categorizing the entities under study,
as in many so-called ‘data-driven’ approaches, then the data-
generating persons must use their own implicit theories to
accomplish this task.
Converting Information About Categorized Entities
Into Semiotically Encoded Information
Thereafter, data-generating persons must represent perceived
occurrences of the thus-categorized entities into the signs used
as data. When information from one kind of phenomenon
is represented in another one, this is called conversion
in the TPS-Paradigm (Uher, 2018a). For systematic and
standardized conversions of information from the empirical
into the symbolic relational system, scientists must specify
which pieces of information from the study phenomena
should be demarcated, categorized and semiotically encoded
in what ways. That is, scientists must define the three
constituents of the signs used as data (see Figure 3) such
that the data-generating persons can execute the measurement
operations.
Scientific Quantifications Generated Directly by
Persons: General Preconditions and Challenges
Psychometricians are rather unconcerned with all these
decisions raters have to make during data generation. Instead,
psychometricians apply sophisticated methods of data modeling
(e.g., Rasch modeling) to demonstrate that the data—once raters
have produced them—exhibit quantitative structures. But data
analysis cannot add fundamental properties that have not been
encoded in the raw data. To what extent are persons actually able
to directly generate scientific quantifications (i.e., quantitative
data that are object-dependent and subject-independent) during
data generation?
For interval and ratio-scaled direct quantifications, spatial
standard units of measurement are widely used (e.g., yard
sticks for length measurement). Distinct entities (i.e., multitudes;
e.g., rope jumps) can be directly counted. If not applicable,
persons can compare several entities with one another—provided
these can be perceived in close spatial and temporal proximity
together—to determine their relative magnitude regarding the
quality of interest (e.g., body height, intensity), thus enabling
ordinal-scaled quantifications8 (e.g., highest, second highest,
third highest; Figure 10).
But persons’ abilities to count or directly compare the
entities of interest with one another or with spatial standards
of measurement are often compromised in momentary and
highly fluctuating phenomena featuring variable properties. For
example, the dynamics of behaviors often hinder applications of
spatial standards of measurement (e.g., to quantify movements).
Direct comparisons between behavioral acts are complicated
8In metrology, ordinal scaled data do not constitute quantifications (BIPM, 2006).
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FIGURE 9 | Decisions to be made by data-generating persons. Data generation requires complex decisions about demarcating, categorizing and encoding the
entities of interest. They are particularly challenging when study phenomena feature variable perceivable properties (e.g., variable spatio-temporal extensions of
behaviors). For example, smiles vary in spatial extensions; humans can turn their mouth corners up in various ways, with mouth open or closed, with or without
laughter lines around their eyes, and all this at various levels of intensity. Given this, what entity can be demarcated and categorized as one (n = 1) smile? Smiles also
vary in temporal extension. Are quick and long-lasting smiles events of the same kind? When does one smile end and another one start? Thus, which particular
demarcable entities can be considered to be sufficiently similar to categorize them as being of the same kind? Making these decisions explicit is important for
establishing traceability of the generated data.
both within individuals because previous acts have already
ceased to be and between individuals because individuals
seldom behave spatio-temporally in parallel with one another (as
arranged in races). To solve this problem, behavioral scientists
(e.g., biologists) apply observational methods enabling time-
based measurement, whereas psychologists and social scientists
primarily use rating methods. These two methods are now
explored in detail and compared with one another.
QUANTITATIVE DATA GENERATION
WITH RATING METHODS VERSUS
OBSERVATIONAL METHODS:
POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS FOR
FULFILLING METROLOGICAL CRITERIA
The TPS-Paradigm’s frameworks and the metrological criteria
of scientific quantification are now applied to deconstruct
the demands that different methods of quantification impose
on data-generating persons, contrasting rating methods with
behavioral observations (starting with the latter). These
elaborations are illustrated by the example of individual-specific
behaviors as study phenomena (behavioral parts of ‘personality’).
To be specific to individuals, behavioral patterns must vary
among individuals and these differences must be stable over
some time (Uher, 2013, 2018b). But neither differential nor
temporal patterns can be directly perceived at any moment.
As behaviors are transient, fluctuating and dynamic, individual
behavior patterns cannot be straightforwardly measured either
(Uher, 2011). This considerably complicates quantifications of
individual-specific behaviors.
Demands Placed on Observers
Targeted Perception and Real-Time Demarcation,
Categorization and Encoding
Observation, unlike looking or watching, involves targeted and
systematic perception of the phenomena and properties under
study. As behaviors are transient, observers must target their
perceptions to relevant properties and must demarcate and
categorize behavioral events in the brief moments while they
occur, thus real-time using nunc-ipsum methods (see above). To
achieve this in standardized ways while observing the continuous
flow of dynamically changing events, observers must know by
heart all elements of the empirical relational system under
study (e.g., all definitions of behavioral acts specified in the
ethogramme), all assignment rules and all variables, units and
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FIGURE 10 | Scientific quantification directly by persons. Scientific quantification directly by persons during data generation is possible only by counting multitudes
and through direct perceptual comparison of the magnitudes of the phenomena and properties under study with one another and with the magnitudes of spatial and
temporal standards of measurement.
values that constitute the symbolic relational system, thus the
data.
To meet these demands, observers are instructed and trained.
Training is possible because behaviors are extroquestively
accessible, which facilitates intersubjective perception and
discussion about the decisions required to generate data.
Observers’ performances are studied as agreement between
codings generated by independent persons observing the same
behaviors in the same individuals and situations at the same
occasions. This subject-independence is statistically analyzed as
inter-observer (inter-coder) reliability. Behaviors’ extroquestive
accessibility also facilitates the design of object-dependent
observation processes involving unbroken documented chains
of comparisons (see Figure 6). Video-based coding software
allows observers to mark the video sequences in which particular
behaviors occur so that their demarcation, categorisation and
encoding can be traced to the specific behaviors observed (as
recorded on video) and to the ways they were quantified.
Defining the Empirical Relational System: Specifying
All Studied Elements of the Sets B, S, I, and T
To enable observers to perceive, demarcate, categorize and
encode behaviors in systematic and standardized ways,
researchers must specify all phenomena to be quantified
(i.e., all elements of the empirical relational system) in terms
of their perceivable qualitative and quantitative properties. For
investigations of individual-specific behaviors, this involves the
set B of all behaviors studied and the set S of all situations in
which they are observed (considering the context-dependent
meanings of behaviors; Uher, 2016b). Researchers must also
specify the set I of individuals studied as well as the set T of
occasions and periods of time in which their behaviors are
recorded (Figure 11A).
The sets of individuals (e.g., sample characteristics) and times
studied (e.g., observation time per individual) are specified in
every method section. Situations can be defined on more abstract
levels as nominal situations (e.g., location, test condition) or on
more fine-grained levels such as regarding specific interpersonal
situations (e.g., being approached by others). This requires
observers to demarcate and categorize situational properties
in addition to the behavioral properties studied, thus further
increasing the demands placed on them. For such fine-grained
analyses, researchers often use video-based techniques enabling
deceleration of the flow of events and repeated observations of
the same instances.
The perceivable qualities of behaviors can often be interpreted
differently regarding their possible functions and meanings. To
enable categorisation, researchers must specify the theoretical
interrelations of the behaviors studied as well as their possible
contexts and observers must know these by heart. Observational
designs must be developed that are practically feasible given
the used settings (e.g., restricted or unrestricted), sampling
methods (e.g., behavior or time sampling) and recording
techniques (e.g., manual or computerized recording). Defining
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FIGURE 11 | Scientific versus subjective quantification. Processes involved in the generation of quantitative data using (A) observational methods versus
(B) assessment methods by the example of investigations of individual-specific behaviors (habitual behaviors forming part of an individual’s ‘personality’).
the studied elements’ theoretical interrelations within and
between the empirical sets B, S, I, and T studied is prerequisite
for specifying the corresponding symbolic relational system
(therefore indicated with primes) involving the sets B′, S′, I′,
and T′ as well as the rules for assignments between both
(Figures 4, 11A).
Measuring and Quantifying Behavioral Events
Real-Time – Possibilities and Limitations
Transience and pronounced spatio-temporal variations of
behaviors require that observers decide flexibly about how to
demarcate events, thus often precluding comparisons with spatial
standards of measurement. Therefore, behavioral events—with
all perceivable spatial variations as defined by the researchers—
are often encoded only in their occurrence or non-occurrence
using binary units (see Figure 9). Scientific quantifications are
then generated through comparison with temporal standards
of measurement. Such quantifications, as they are based on
behaviors’ temporal properties, may differ from quantifications
that could be obtained from their spatial properties. Time-
based measurement puts high demands on observers because
they must monitor time in addition to the behavioral and
situational properties studied. It also requires clear specification
of the perceivable divisible properties used for quantification (see
Figure 9). Software- and video-based observation technologies
facilitate the nunc-ipsum recording of occurrences, onsets and
ends of binarily encoded behavioral events, producing time-based
log-files (Uher, 2013, 2015b; Uher et al., 2013a).
Summarizing, behavioral observations place high demands on
the data-generating persons. They show that persons’ abilities to
directly generate quantifications that meet axioms of quantity and
measurement are very limited. This often confines observational
data to nominal formats; but these data are clearly defined and
traceable and thus suited to generate scientific quantifications
post hoc (see next). By recording the events of interest in nominal
units while or immediately after they occur (nunc-ipsum),
observers have already completed their task. They are required
neither to memorize events observed, nor to directly quantify
them nor to mentally compute their empirical occurrences or
interrelations within and across the empirical sets B, S, I, and T.
Such computations are made by researchers in subsequent steps
of data analysis using the elements of the symbolic relational
system generated.
After Observations Are Completed:
Post hoc Generation of Ratio-Scaled Data
From Nominal-Scaled Raw Data
Nominal data indicate classification, which is essential for
measurement but not yet quantification. Because nominal units
disjunctively encode occurrence or non-occurrence of qualitative
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properties, nominal-scaled raw data can be used to generate
ratio-scaled quantifications, which meet the axioms of quantity
and quantification, post hoc—after raw data generation has been
completed. Generating ratio-scaled quantifications of individual-
specific behaviors (‘personality’ scores) requires three steps
(Figure 11A; Uher, 2011, 2013).
First, to generate data reflecting individual patterns, each
individual’s raw data are aggregated over specified time periods,
thus, they are temporally standardized. Formally speaking, in the
symbolic relational system, the nominal-scaled data (multitudes)
of each studied element b′n for each studied element i′n within
each studied element s′n are aggregated (counted) and then
related to all studied elements t′n of the set T′. Because non-
occurrence of events defines an absolute zero point, the data
thus-generated are ratio-scaled. Most behavioral coding software
executes this step automatically (e.g., computing durations and
frequencies).
Second, to generate data reflecting patterns of individual
differences, individuals’ data must be differentially standardized
within the sample and each situation studied (e.g., using
z-standardization). Formally speaking, the data generated in
step 1 for each element i′n within each element b′n and each
element s′n are statistically standardized across the entire set I′ of
individuals (Figure 11A). Differential standardization transforms
data reflecting absolute quantifications into data reflecting
relative between-individual differences. As these transformations
are made explicitly and post hoc, individuals’ absolute scores
can always be traced for interpretation and possible re-analyses
as well as for comparisons with other sets of individuals, thus
fulfilling the criterion of object-dependence of measurement
outcomes. Differential standardization enables direct comparison
of individuals’ relative scores among behavioral variables of
different kind (e.g., frequencies, durations) both within and
between individuals. It also enables statistical aggregation into
more abstract and composite variables on the basis of algorithms
(e.g., different weighting of behaviors) that are specified in
the theoretical definitions of the empirical relational system.
Importantly, these comparisons and aggregations are always
made with regard to the differential patterns reflected in the
data, not with regard to individuals’ absolute scores (computed
in step 1) because these may generally vary across behaviors and
situations (Uher, 2011).
Third, differential patterns can reflect individual-specificity
only if they are stable across time periods longer than those in
which they were first ascertained and in ways considered to be
meaningful (e.g., defined by test-retest correlation strength; Uher,
2018b). Hence, identifying individual-specificity in behavior
requires temporal analyses of differential patterns that are defined
by certain temporal patterns in themselves (Uher et al., 2013a).
Therefore, the symbolic set T′ of occasions and spans of time
is divided into subsets (e.g., t′1 and t′2), and steps 1 and 2 are
performed separately on these subsets to enable between-subset
comparisons for test–retest reliability analysis. Sufficient test–
retest reliability provided, the differential patterns obtained in
step 2 are then aggregated across the subsets t′n to obtain data
reflecting ratio-scaled quantifications of individual-specificity in
behaviors (Figure 11A).
Importantly, this post hoc data processing is done by
researchers and constitutes first steps of data analysis, which
is independent of observers’ data generation task. These
analytical steps are described here to highlight the complexity
of the comparisons required to scientifically quantify individual-
specific behaviors. This puts into perspective the demands placed
on raters.
Demands Placed on Raters
Quantifying Individual-Specific Behaviors Directly
– An Impossible Requirement
To quantify individual-specific behaviors with rating methods,
relevant behaviors are described in sets of statements, called
items, that constitute a rating ‘instrument’ (e.g., questionnaire,
inventory, and survey). Persons, the raters, are asked to judge
the behaviors described (e.g., “tends to be lazy”) regarding, for
example, their occurrences, intensity or typicality for a target
individual. Raters are asked to indicate their judgements on
rating scales comprising a fixed set of answer categories often
labeled lexically (e.g., “agree” or “neither agree nor disagree”
and “disagree”). Hence, raters are asked to directly quantify
individual-specific behaviors.
But in everyday life and without recording technologies,
persons often cannot directly quantify even single behavioral
events (see section “Demands Placed on Observers”).
Quantifying individual specificity in behaviors (or other
kinds of phenomena) requires quantifying not only single events
and individual patterns in many behaviors but also differences
among individuals and over time. But in transient, dynamic
and fluctuating phenomena, differential and temporal patterns
cannot be directly perceived and thus cannot be quantified at any
moment. Individual specificity is not an entity one could directly
perceive but an abstract idea constructed by humans. For this
construction, human language is essential.
Language – Essential for Abstract Thinking but Also
Misleading
Language allows persons to semiotically represent perceivable
phenomena (e.g., concrete behavioral acts) in single words (e.g.,
“shout”, “kick”). This allows perceivable qualities to be made
independent of their immediate perception and to abstract
them into objects, thus reifying them (“aggression”). This so-
called hypostatic abstraction (Peirce, 1958, CP 4.227) enables
people to develop not only concrete words that refer to directly
perceivable phenomena but also abstract words that refer to
ideas and concepts describing phenomena that are distant
from immediate perception (Vygotsky, 1962) or complex and
imperceptible in themselves—such as constructs of ‘personality’
(e.g., “aggressiveness”). Signs (e.g., rating items) therefore cannot
reflect the referents they denote (Figure 3) in the same ways as
individuals can perceive them.
People (including scientists) often tend to mistake linguistic
abstractions for concrete realities. This so-called fallacy of
misplaced concreteness (Whitehead, 1929) misleads people to
assume that the complex phenomena described with abstract
terms (e.g., in rating items) could be directly perceived. It
also occurs when people encode their ideas about individual
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specificity in abstract terms (e.g., ‘personality’, ‘traits’, ‘character’,
or ‘dispositions’), and then treat these abstractions as real
entities that they assume to underlie individuals’ feeling, thinking
and behaving and thus to be located internally. This entails
explanatory circularity (Uher, 2013, 2018b).
Further challenges occur because semiotic representations
contain implicit structures in both their external physical
constituents (e.g., phonetics) and the particular meanings of
the referents assigned to them (e.g., semantics). These implicit
structures and meanings are not readily apparent because no
physical border demarcates a sign’s three constituents as an entity
(see above). This entails intricacies for language-based methods
like ratings.
Standardized Rating Items Do Not Reflect
Standardized Meanings—Instead, Their Meanings
Vary Within and Between Individuals
Like in observations, variables and units of rating scales (as
elements of the symbolic relational system) are predetermined
and fixed. But unlike in observations, raters are commonly
neither instructed nor trained to interpret and use them
in standardized ways—thus in how to understand the given
symbolic relational system and to relate it to the empirical
relational system under study (in fact, both systems are
confounded in rating methods; see Figure 7).
Rating scales are worded in everyday language in abstract and
generalized ways to make them applicable to diverse phenomena,
events and contexts without specifying any particular ones.
Therefore, raters must use their common-sense knowledge to
interpret and contextualize the given scale and to construct
specific meanings for the rating task at hand. Common-sense
categories are, however, not as well-elaborated and disjunctive
as scientific categories but often fuzzy and context-sensitive,
enabling flexible demarcations (Hammersley, 2013). To reduce
cognitive effort, raters may interpret items on the abstract
level on which they are worded—the semantic level (Shweder
and D’Andrade, 1980; Block, 2010). Semantic processing may
be triggered especially by highly inferential items requiring
judgments of the social valence, appropriateness, and normativity
of individual behaviors (e.g., “respectful”, “socially adapted”) or
of their underlying aims and motivations (e.g., “helping”).
As meanings are not inherent but only assigned to the physical
constituents of signs (e.g., phonemes, graphemes), meanings
vary. For popular personality questionnaires, substantial within-
and between-individual variations in item interpretations have
meanwhile been demonstrated, highlighting that—contrary
to common assumptions—standardized items represent not
standardized meanings but broad and heterogeneous fields
of meaning (Valsiner et al., 2005; Rosenbaum and Valsiner,
2011; Arro, 2013; Lundmann and Villadsen, 2016; Uher and
Visalberghi, 2016).
In personality psychology, broadly worded rating items are
known to be related to broader ranges of more heterogeneous
and less specific behaviors and situations, thus representing
more diverse aspects of given constructs (Borkenau and
Müller, 1991). So far, such fidelity-bandwidth trade-offs were
not regarded problematic because more abstract items have
FIGURE 12 | Diverse item interpretations spanning a field of meaning.
Interpretations provided by N = 112 raters for a fictitious target person scoring
high on the item. Main-themes (bold frames) summarize sub-themes of similar
interpretations (non-bold frames). Numbers indicate percentages of raters
who provided given interpretations; for the main-themes, each rater was
counted just once even when they provided multiple similar interpretations as
specified in the corresponding sub-themes.
higher predictive validity for broader ranges of behaviors (e.g.,
job performance; Ones and Viswesvaran, 1996). Following
instrumentalist epistemologies, broad rating items were even
considered necessary to match the breadth of the criteria to be
predicted (Hogan and Roberts, 1996).
From a measurement perspective, however, fidelity-
bandwidth trade-offs are highly problematic because they
entail lack of traceability of what has actually been encoded in
the data. An example illustrates this. Interpretations of “tends
to be lazy”, operationalizing the construct Conscientiousness
in a popular personality inventory (BFI-10; Rammstedt and
John, 2007), varied considerably within and among 112 raters.
Raters variously associated this item with different behaviors
and situations related to work, an inactive life style, appearance
and orderliness, not keeping deadlines and lack of motivation
(Figure 12; Uher and Dharyial, unpublished). This diversity
may reflect the well-known fidelity-bandwidth trade-offs of
broadly worded items. But importantly, every rater provided on
average only two different interpretations (M = 2.08; SD = 0.92;
range = 1–5). Thus, the single raters did not consider the item’s
broad field of meaning that it may generally have in their socio-
linguistic community. Instead, when judging the target person,
different raters thought of very different behaviors and contexts;
some considered “sleeping a lot”, others “shifting work on
others”, still others “eating fast food”, or “not keeping deadlines”
(Figure 12). This may explain the substantial variations in
internal consistencies of personality scales across countries (see
above).
Moreover, raters’ item interpretations can also go beyond
the bandwidth of meanings that researchers may consider.
A study involving five-method comparisons showed that,
despite expert-based item generation, raters’ item interpretations
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 18 December 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2599
fpsyg-09-02599 December 19, 2018 Time: 16:6 # 19
Uher Quantitative Data From Rating Scales
clearly referred also to constructs other than those intended
to be operationalized; raters’ and researchers’ interpretations
overlapped to only 54.1–70.4% (Uher and Visalberghi, 2016).
Variations in item interpretation are an unavoidable
consequence of the abstract and generalized wording of items
and the necessity for raters to apply them to specific cases, and
therefore occur despite careful iterative item selection (Uher
and Visalberghi, 2016). They show that, for different raters,
the same item variables do not represent the same meanings
(symbolic relational system); consequently, raters do not have
the same empirical relational system in mind. This precludes
subject-independence and also limits possibilities to establish
object-dependence. These issues are ethically problematic
because ‘personality’ ratings are used not only for making
predictions (following instrumental epistemologies) but also to
identify properties that are attributable to the target individuals
(following naïve-realist epistemologies).
Unknown Demarcation, Categorization and Encoding
Decisions: The Referents Raters Consider for Their
Ratings Remain Unspecified
A key feature of rating methods is the introquestive data
generation in retrospect. This allows persons to generate data any
time, in any situation (e.g., online), and even in complete absence
of the phenomena (e.g., behaviors) and individuals under study.
This contributes to the enormous efficiency of ratings (Uher,
2015e)—but has numerous methodical implications.
Persons can encode in data relevant information about
the study phenomena only if they can directly perceive the
phenomena and properties under study during data generation.
Direct perceptibility is prerequisite for establishing object-related
measurement processes (see above). But quantitative ratings
inherently involve also comparisons among individuals or over
time or both. To rate (one’s own or others’) individual-specific
behaviors, raters must consider past behaviors and situations,
thus phenomena no longer extroquestively accessible. Raters can
form such judgments only by retrieving pertinent information
from memory; therefore, ratings are long-term memory-based
introquestive methods9 (Uher, 2018a).
Human abilities to reconstruct memorized events are
generally constrained, susceptible to various fallacies and
influenced by situational contexts (Shweder and D’Andrade,
1980; Schacter, 1999; Schacter and Addis, 2007). Therefore,
assessments are influenced by raters’ motivations and goals
(Biesanz and Human, 2010). Moreover, in individuals’ psychical
systems, past events are stored not in the forms as once
perceived but only in abstracted, integrated and often lexically
encoded form (Le Poidevin, 2011; Valsiner, 2012). Individuals
can base their ratings only on the outcomes of their past
processing of past perceptions and conceptions; thus, on the
beliefs, narratives and knowledge they have developed about
individuals in general and the target individual in particular.
Ratings cannot encode (habitual) behaviors in themselves,
9Not all introquestive methods are based on long-term memory recall. Further
methods involve nunc-ipsum introquestion (e.g., thinking aloud methods) and
retro-introquestion (e.g., diary methods; for details and criteria, see Uher, 2018a).
as sometimes assumed, but only the psychical and semiotic
representations raters have developed about them—which are
phenomena very different from behaviors (see above; Uher, 2013,
2015d, 2016a,b).
When raters’ responses are restricted to ticking boxes
on standardized scales, not only remain differences in item
interpretations unknown but also raters’ decisions on how to
demarcate, categorize and encode the phenomena and properties
that they consider as the referents of their ratings (elements of
the empirical relational system). Formally stated, the elements
of the set Bi of ideas about behaviors, the set Si of ideas about
behavioral situations, the sets Ii of ideas about individuals,
the set Ti of ideas about occasions and spans of time as
well as the ideas about these elements’ empirical occurrences
and interrelations that raters implicitly consider cannot be
specified (Figure 11B). Consequently, raters’ decisions during
data generation and their degree of standardization and reliability
cannot be analyzed. With inter-rater reliability, psychometricians
analyze only agreement in the data sets produced (symbolic
relational system) but not agreement in the ways in which
raters demarcate and categorize information from the study
phenomena (empirical relational system) and convert and encode
them in the data (representational mapping between both
systems). Insufficient or even lacking specification of the objects
of research (Figure 7) hinders the design of object-dependent
measurement processes and compromises the interpretability of
data and findings.
In rating methods, every item variable is commonly used only
once to generate one single datum per target individual and
rater. In extroquestive nunc-ipsum methods like observations, by
contrast, measurement variables can be used without limitation
to encode defined elements of the empirical relational system
as often as these may empirically occur—observational methods
are matched to the study phenomena (object-dependence).
The same variable can be used to generate entire data sets
per target individual and observer (Figures 11A,B). In rating
methods, by contrast, variables are presented in a fixed order
predetermined by the researcher and that is mostly random
with regard to the empirical relational systems they are meant
to operationalize. Consequently, occurrences of events in raters’
minds are triggered by and adapted to the given rating scale—
the study phenomena are matched to the methods rather than vice
versa (Westen, 1996; Toomela and Valsiner, 2010; Omi, 2012;
Uher, 2015d,e).
Unknown and Changing Units and Assignment Rules
Scale categories are commonly labeled with global terms (e.g.,
“strongly”, “often”), icons (e.g. ,, /), numerals or segmented
lines. Given the well-known fidelity-bandwidth trade-offs of
broadly worded rating items, researchers commonly assume that,
for any given rating, raters consider a broader range of evidence
to form an overall judgment that they then indicate in a single
score on the scale. But how do raters actually choose the answer
box on the scale? How do they interpret and use quantitative scale
categories at all?
To constitute measurement units, scale categories must
refer to the same quality as defined by the item variable.
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The different scale categories assigned to each variable must
represent divisible properties, thus different quantities of that
quality. These categories’ interrelations must adequately reflect
the interrelations among the quantities of the empirical relational
system that they encode. Thus, a lower score on the scale must
indicate a lower quantity of the quality under study than a higher
score on that same scale. Statistical aggregation across different
items—a common practice in psychometrics—presupposes that
the scale units have the same meaning for all the item variables
for which they are used; similarly, metric units of weight
(e.g., kg, lb) have the same meaning for all kinds of objects,
whether stones, persons or feathers. Statistical aggregation across
different raters—another common practice in psychometrics—
presupposes that the different raters interpret and use the same
scale in the same way. Similarly, different weighing machines, no
matter how constructed, should be standardized (i.e., calibrated)
and provide the same results for the same object. Hence,
measurement outcomes should be subject-independent.
But similar to item interpretations, raters’ interpretation and
use of scale categories vary substantially within and between
raters (Rosenbaum and Valsiner, 2011). When asked to judge a
film protagonist’s personality on a five-stage agreement scale and
to explain their choice of the answer category, 78 raters provided
very different reasons (Figure 13 depicts reasons provided for the
BFI-10 item “is outgoing, sociable” operationalizing the construct
Extraversion; Uher, unpublished). Only 10.7% of all explanations
indicated that raters considered and weighted various pieces
of evidence as commonly assumed (highlighted in red). About
15% indicated that raters based their ratings on the occurrence
of one single instance, such as a key indicator or their first
impression (highlighted in blue), ignoring all other pieces of
evidence available. Most explanations (67.7%) showed that raters
found there was not enough evidence to make a judgment, that
they missed key indicators, attributed the behaviors observed to
the situation or found them not genuine, and thus not indicative
of the target’s personality, among further reasons. But all raters
had ticked a box.
The diversity of reasons for ticking rating scales and
the triviality of many decisions that raters reported to have
made shows that raters’ interpretations of scale categories
vary considerably. Quite many interpretations do not refer to
quantitative considerations at all. Moreover, raters assigned the
same reasons to different categories, which have thus not distinct
but overlapping meanings (Figure 13). This shows that raters do
not interpret and use these scales in standardized ways, and that
they do not apply fixed determinative assignment rules to indicate
their judgments in the scale units. Neither object-dependence
nor subject-independence can be established. But all this remains
unknown because raters are commonly not asked to explain how
they have generated their ratings.
FIGURE 13 | Raters’ interpretations of scale categories. Reasons provided by N = 78 raters for their ratings of a target person seen in a film on the BFI-10 item “. . .
is outgoing, sociable”. Numbers in parentheses indicate absolute frequencies of reasons provided; multiple nominations possible.
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FIGURE 14 | Mental processes involved in rating generation. Raters’ ad hoc interpretations of the rating items and scales, their ad hoc decisions about the actual
objects of research as well as their formation of an overall judgment remain unknown.
Lack of Traceability of Intuitive Ratings Cannot Be
Overcome by Converting Rating Scale Categories
post hoc Into Numerals
Once raters have completed raw data generation, researchers
commonly recode the (often lexically encoded) answer categories
into numerals and treat these as numbers. This means that
“have not seen enough evidence” can be recoded into the same
numerical score as “missed a key indicator” or “found the
behavior not genuine” (e.g., “4”). Likewise, “found behavior
was due to situation not the target person” and “unsure if
what I saw is related to the item” can be recoded into a
higher Extraversion score for the target person (e.g., “3”)
than “have seen a key indicator for low sociability” (e.g.,
“2”). Hence, the interrelations of the numbers into which
researchers recode scale categories (e.g., order of magnitude)
do not match the interrelations of the answer categories
as raters have interpreted and used them (Figures 13, 14).
Instead of constituting quantities of the quality specified
in the item, raters’ interpretations of scale units rather
constituted further qualities in themselves, such as ideas of
the considered behaviors’ authenticity, relevance and situation-
dependence.
Summarizing, the requirement to generate data
introquestively and long-term memory-based, the lack of
information about the representational system under study
and the constraint response format prevent that researchers
come to know about how raters actually understand and use
rating scales. This precludes intersubjective discussion about
the interpretation of the data generated and thus establishing
subject-independence. Instead, researchers commonly interpret
rating data with regard to the meanings that they themselves
assign to the item variables, supported by countless validation
studies. But for any single rating, raters obviously do not
consider the broad fields of meaning an item may generally
have in their sociolinguistic community. Instead, for the
specific case at hand, they construe specific meanings, which
constitute only a fraction of the item’s overall field of meaning
(Figures 14, 15).
Moreover, researchers interpret the units and values of
rating data with regard to the meanings of numbers that
they themselves assign to the scale categories. This recoding
of units constitutes a conversion of information that, in
itself, is based on well-documented and unbroken chains of
comparisons from raters’ ticks on the scales, thus creating
perfect traceability. But the quantifications thus-obtained cannot
be traced to the referents (empirical relational system) that
raters have aimed to encode in their ratings (symbolic relational
system), thus also precluding the establishment of object-
dependent data generation processes. Researchers’ rigid recoding
of answer categories breaks the chain of traceability that could
be established if raters’ judgment and encoding processes were
systematically explored (Figures 14, 15).
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FIGURE 15 | Twofold break in traceability. Researchers’ broad item interpretations and rigid recoding of answer categories into numerals interpreted as numbers
entail shifts in interpretation that break the connections to (1) raters’ interpretations of items and scale units, and thus also to (2) raters’ perceptions and
interpretations of the actual phenomena and properties that raters have considered and encoded in their ratings.
CONCLUSION
Application of the TPS-Paradigm’s metatheoretical and
methodological frameworks opened up novel perspectives
on methods of quantitative data generation in psychology and
social sciences. They showed that concepts from metrology
can be meaningfully applied even if the objects of research are
abstract constructs. But they also revealed serious limitations of
rating methods.
Psychological and social-science concepts of ‘measurement’
were not built on metrological theories and not meant to
meet metrological criteria. But when ratings are treated as
‘quantitative’ data and subjected to statistical analysis, and when
their results are used to make inferences on and decisions about
individuals and real-world problems, then the generation of
these numerical data must conform to the principles of scientific
(metrological) measurement. In the times of replication crises
and Big Data, these methodological mismatches can no longer
be ignored.
Quantitative Versus Qualitative Methods
– An Inaccurate and Misleading Divide
The analyses showed that all quantitative methods presuppose
qualitative categorizations because “quantities are of qualities”
(Kaplan, 1964, p. 207). Objects of research can only be
identified by their qualities. The common polarization of so-
called ‘quantitative methods’ versus ‘qualitative methods’, reflects
misconceptions of the measurement-theoretical foundations of
scientific quantification.
Raters’ explanations of their scale responses revealed that
they consider rating scale units not as quantitative but rather
as qualitatively different categories. Researchers increasingly
consider this, such as by reporting percentages of raters who
ticked particular categories rather than calculating averages or
medians over rigidly assigned numbers. Unlike rating methods,
many so-called ‘qualitative methods’, feature operational
structures to establish object-dependent data generation
processes and traceable outcomes (Uher, 2018a). Qualitative
data thus-generated can be used to derive post hoc ratio-scaled
quantifications, such as by computing frequencies of the
occurrences of key themes in textual data (e.g., content analysis;
Flick, 2014). In summary, all methods inherently explore
qualitative properties of their objects of research and only some
of them additionally enable these qualitative properties to be
quantified.
The concept of semiotic representations illuminates a further
controversy underlying the qualitative-quantitative debate. So-
called quantitative researchers (using rating methods) focus
on the interrelations between the signs’ physical constituents
(signifier; e.g., item statements) and their referents (e.g., target
persons’ behaviors), whereas so-called qualitative researchers
focus on the signifiers’ interrelations with the meanings (the
signified) that particular persons construct for them (Figure 3).
The former researchers tend to ignore the composite’s psychical
constituent, the latter its referent (see similarly Bhaskar, 1994).
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This shows that the different epistemologies underlying so-
called qualitative and quantitative methods are not per se
incommensurate with one another. Rather, their proponents
only focus on different aspects in the triadic relations inherent
to semiotic representations. This metatheoretical concept will
therefore be useful to help find common ground and develop
integrative concepts and methodologies in the future.
Assessments on Rating Scales Are Not
Measurements—Rating Data do Not
Constitute Scientific Quantifications
Not every quantification is an outcome of measurement. For valid
inferences from quantifications generated to properties of the
actual phenomena under study, measurement processes must be
established that are object-dependent, producing results that are
subject-independent and thus traceable.
Key to scientific measurement and quantification is
standardization. But not any kind of standardization fulfills
the necessary requirements. Standardized scale presentation,
administration, instruction and scoring are fundamental to
rating methods (Walsh and Betz, 2000). But they standardize
only the format of data encoding, not the ways in which
raters actually generate the data. Therefore, assessments do not
constitute measurements and should not be labeled as such.
The current use of the term measurement in psychology and
social sciences largely constitutes a cross-disciplinary jingle
fallacy (same term denotes different concepts; Thorndike, 1903),
which creates misunderstandings and hampers exchange and
development.
Problematic Assumptions in
Psychometrics
The numerals into which psychometricians rigidly recode
raters’ ticks on the scales do not constitute measurement-based
quantifications. Rasch analysis and conjoint measurement, often
assumed to enable quantitative measurement with rating data
(Borsboom and Mellenbergh, 2004; Michell, 2014), are only
methods for modeling data once they have been generated. These
methods show that rating data, as recoded and interpreted by the
researchers (i.e., units interpreted as reflecting numbers, items
as reflecting broad fields of meanings) can exhibit particular
quantitative properties (e.g., additivity). But these properties
are obtained through rigorous psychometric variable selection
that align the data generation process to statistical assumptions
rather than to properties of the actual objects of research, thus
precluding object-dependence.
This entails a twofold break in traceability in the triadic
interactions involved in human-generated data generation—first,
to raters’ interpretation and use of the rating scales as methods,
and second, to their perceptions and interpretations of the
actual phenomena and properties under study. As a consequence,
quantitative properties ascertained in psychometric analyses
cannot be attributed to the actual referents of the raw data (e.g.,
target persons’ properties) as conceived by the raters who have
generated these data (Figure 15).
Consequences for the Replicability and
Transparency of Data
The methodological problems involved in rating methods,
especially the inability to establish traceable chains of information
conversions from the objects of research to the outcomes of
data generation, may constitute a major reason for the lack of
replicability in psychology and social sciences not yet considered.
“Robust measures”, often proposed as a solution to this problem
(Carpenter, 2012; Yong, 2012; Asendorpf et al., 2013), are
unlikely to be attained with rating-based quantifications. On the
contrary, the standardisations implemented in rating methods
may lead to systematic errors because consistency in data
structure is achieved at the cost of data accuracy in terms of
standardized and traceable relations to the actual phenomena
under study and the ways in which they were quantified (see
Hammersley, 2013).
Consequences for the Validity and Utility
of Data: Interpretability Presupposes
Traceability
Nowadays, rating data can be generated quickly and at large scale
(e.g., online-questionnaires; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Chandler
and Paolacci, 2017; Buchanan and Scofield, 2018) producing
floods of data—Big Data. But to answer research questions
and to find solutions for real-world problems, scientists must
eventually interpret the data produced. This article showed that,
in the process of data generation, information must be converted
from perceptions and conceptions of the study phenomena into
signs. But in the process of data interpretation, information
must be converted in the reverse direction from the signs back
to conceptions and ideas about the actual phenomena under
study. Such backward conversions of information may not be
straightforwardly possible because signs, especially mathematical
ones, can be abstracted, processed and changed in ways not
applicable to the properties of the actual study phenomena
(Brower, 1949; Trierweiler and Stricker, 1998), highlighting the
importance of traceability not only in data generation but also in
data analysis.
Major Tasks Still Laying Ahead
As interpretations of rating scales are based on everyday
knowledge with its fuzzy and flexible categories, any
interpretation of rating data can appear plausible (Laucken,
1974). But the purpose of scientific measurement is to quantify
phenomena in the real world—not to construe a possible match
with data that can be generated even in absence of the persons,
phenomena and properties under study. Therefore, traceability
is a fundamental requirement for scientific quantification that
should be implemented systematically also in the methods
used to generate quantitative data in psychology and the social
sciences. This article started to elaborate some principles by
which this can be achieved.
Psychologists and social scientists must finally investigate
how people actually understand and use rating scales to
generate quantitative data in research and applied contexts.
Exploring raters’ mental processes and the meanings they
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attribute to items and scale categories is key to specifying
the representational systems underlying rating data, which, in
many fields, make up much of the current empirical data
basis.
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